POLS451 Rational Choice in Politics and Society
Annotation:
COURSE ANNOTATION AND AIMS:
This course is designed to examine a set (family) of theories usually but not necessary always mathematical those are dealing with rational decision making on individual and collective level and their implementation in social life from bargaining to institutions and in politics in particular.
Lecturers:
Asst. Prof. Kiril Avramov, PhD
Course Description:
Competencies:
After completing successfully this course the students will:
1) know: To distinguish the possibilities and limits of these techniques when applied to the field of social science
2) be able to: To use the instruments provided by rational choice and game theories and apply them in their further research.
Prerequisites:
PRELIMINARY REQUIREMENTS: Familiarity with basic concepts of political science and formal logic
Types:
Full-time Programmes
Types of Courses:
Lecture
Language of teaching:
English
Topics:
Bibliography:
• William H. Riker. 1982. Liberalism against Populism. Waveland Press.
• Thomas C. Schelling. 1960. The Strategy of Conflict. Harvard University Press.
• Thomas C. Schelling. 1978. Micromotives and Macrobehavior. W.W. Norton.
• Michael Taylor. 1987. The Possibility of Cooperation. Cambridge University Press.
• R.H. Coase. 1988. "Notes on the Problem of Social Cost." In The Firm, the Market, and the Law. University of Chicago Press.
• Douglass C. North. 1990. "A Transaction Cost Theory of Politics." Journal of Theoretical Politics 2:355-367
• Randall L. Calvert. 1995. "The Rational Choice Theory of Social Institutions: Cooperation, Coordination, and Communication." In Modern Political Economy, eds. Jeffrey S. Banks and Eric A. Hanushek. Cambridge University Press.
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Assessment:
FORMS OF EVALUATION CURRENT CONTROL COMBINED EVALUATION FINAL EXAM
TEST
WRITTEN ASINGMENT 25 % 50% 50%
PRACTICAL ASIGNEMNT
PORTFOLIO
ORAL EXAM
SEMINARS 25%